By Shin Hanho, PhD
As US airstrikes on Iran enter their third week, the conflict is taking on the character of a protracted war of attrition rather than a short, decisive campaign. Without the deployment of ground forces, a “complete victory” will be difficult to achieve. The more consequential issue, however, lies beyond the battlefield. This conflict is already reshaping China’s calculus over Taiwan, the nuclear order in the Middle East, global oil prices, Washington’s management of alliances, and South Korea’s security and trade burdens.
There are, at least on the surface, some positive implications. First, the likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may decline in the near term. Within China, concerns over the costs of military adventurism are already significant, and the US response in this conflict is likely to strengthen more cautious voices within the military establishment. Taiwan is not simply a question of intent, but of managing the risks of US intervention.
Second, the debate over the timing of action against Iran’s nuclear programme has resurfaced. While some argue that Iran remains two to three years away from completing its capabilities, others see the present moment as a last window for effective deterrence. The failure to halt North Korea’s nuclear development at an earlier stage continues to cast a long shadow over this debate.
Third, the war may enhance the credibility of South Korean defence systems. As Korean-made weapons demonstrate reliability under real-world conditions, the potential for expanding defence exports could increase. In defence markets, operational validation often matters more than specifications.
Yet the negative consequences are likely to be more substantial. The central risk is that of an incomplete intervention. If the conflict ends without fully dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure or ambitions, Tehran may pursue its programme with greater urgency and less restraint. Such an outcome could accelerate the risk of nuclear proliferation across the Middle East.
A further concern lies in the possibility of a Trump-style conclusion. There remains a real chance that Washington could declare an early victory and withdraw, regardless of conditions on the ground. In that scenario, the intervention may leave the region more unstable than before. The Strait of Hormuz, in particular, would become a focal point of risk. If Iran retains its capacity to threaten maritime routes, global oil prices, logistics costs, and inflationary pressures could all rise. Markets would once again become hostages to geopolitical tension.
The implications for alliances are equally significant. The US may be perceived as having initiated strikes and subsequently demanding support from its allies. This shifts the issue from one of legitimacy to one of trust. If alliances are treated less as frameworks for coordination and more as instruments of mobilisation, the long-term damage to credibility could be considerable. The political consequences will likely surface, at least in part, in the US midterm elections in November. Trump may face electoral backlash, but he could also seek to leverage wartime narratives for political gain.
In neither case is South Korea likely to find itself in a comfortable position. If Trump weakens politically, uncertainty will increase; if he emerges stronger, demands on allies may intensify. These could include higher defence cost-sharing, stronger alignment against China, and greater trade pressure. In particular, there is a risk that South Korea and Japan will be redefined as partners expected to shoulder a larger share of US strategic costs.
Ultimately, the core issue of the Iran war does not lie in the Middle East alone. Its consequences will return in the form of oil prices, alliance dynamics, elections, and negotiations. For South Korea, this is not simply a moment to focus on defence export opportunities. It is also a time to recognise that energy costs, logistics disruptions, security expenditures, and the burden of negotiations with Washington may all rise simultaneously.
Wars may begin far away, but their costs are often felt much closer to home.
