Series Index

1 The Korean War and Its Global Legacy: From Battlefields to Adoption Airlifts
2. Adoptions after the Korean War
3. Explaining the South Korean Economic Miracle
4. Medical Innovations During the Korean War
5. New Archives Analysis on the Origins of the Korean War
6. The Korean War Transformed the Cold War?
7. Religion After the Korean War on the Peninsula
8. American Intervention in Korea
9. A Focus on Some Veterans in South Korea and France
10. Anti-Americanism in South Korean Society

By Riyad Moosoody

If anti-Americanism exists in South Korean society, what is its breadth and depth? How is the generational shift affecting the Seoul-Washington alliance? In 2018, an open questionnaire was developed by researchers in Seoul to examine Korean students' and adults' perceptions of American society and people, and their impact on South Korea, the Korean peninsula and the world.  A total of 270 middle-school students and their parents (270 mothers and 270 fathers) and 140 high-school students and their parents (140 mothers and 140 fathers) completed an open-ended questionnaire designed by the researchers. A total of 1,230 participants were asked to provide written answers to the following questions:

1 - What is your perception of the following aspects of the United States: (a) society, (b) people, (c) business, (d) government, (e) culture, (f) values, and (g) soldiers stationed in South Korea.
2 - What is your perception of American influence in monitoring the following aspects of South Korea: (a) society, (b) economy, (c) business, (d) population, (e) culture, (f) politics, (g) relations between North and South Korea, and (h) unification.
3 - What is your perception of American influence in the world: (a) political, (b) economic, (c) security and (d) cultural?
The results suggest that the Koreans surveyed have a mixed view of American society. They are likely to see it as progressive and meritocratic, but also as profit-driven and exclusionary. University students are the most likely to see American society as progressive and meritocratic, but also as profit-driven and exclusionary. Adults have a positive view of American society and are the least likely to have a negative one. University students have a mixed view of the United States, admiring it on the one hand and hating it on the other. College students have the most negative view of American society; they are the least likely to see its positive aspects. They are the least likely to see American society as law-abiding, meritocratic and progressive. 

How can the generational shift in perceptions of the United States be explained? College students have the most negative view of Americans. They are more likely to see them as self-centered, and less likely to see them as responsible, open-minded, practical, worthy of respect and confident. Adults, on the other hand, are more likely to see Americans as open-minded, worthy of respect and confident, and less likely to see them as self-centered. The results clearly indicate a generational shift in which the younger generation does not perceive a positive influence from the United States, but only a negative one, which is very different from their parents' opinion. This may be due to several factors. The older generation grew up during social and economic crises, and some have experienced war. Consequently, they recognize the positive influence of the United States in protecting and building South Korea (Kim 2016, 32).

The younger generation grew up after the Gwangju massacre in 1980, and since then, most American media have reported negatively on it. Since 1980, relations with the United States have been portrayed in a negative light, including reports of unfair trade negotiations with the United States, a series of crimes committed by American soldiers that have gone unpunished, and even sporting events whose results and reactions have been perceived in a biased way. The younger generation has grown up exposed to this negative media coverage, which is not offset by positive information. What is more, the United States government and companies haven't made much effort to provide positive information and contacts. The United States government may have taken the relationship for granted and felt that Koreans would be eternally grateful (Kim 2016, p. 34).

The adult generation grew up in a time of poverty and social unrest, when "Made in USA" was associated with quality and admiration. The younger generation grew up in a time when Korea became a world leader in many fields: Samsung is now a world leader in the development and production of memory cards, Hyundai is a world leader in shipbuilding and the automotive industry, Pohang Steel is a world leader in the steel industry, and Korean companies are world leaders in LED displays (Kim 2016, p. 124). Korean products are considered to be of equal or higher quality than those made in the United States. The adult generation grew up listening to American pop music, while the younger generation listens to Korean hip-hop and rap. They are less inclined to listen to American pop music or to consider it to be better. The younger generation is confident and optimistic about the future. They believe they can create a better nation for themselves and their country.

Growing anti-American sentiment represents the younger generation's desire for self-determination in their own country. In the minds of the young people that I met and interviewed at the University of Bordeaux during a series of lectures by professors from other universities organized by the Korean Department in 2020 by Professor Stéphane Couralet, for many, Korea is no longer a "shrimp in the middle of a whale fight,"; however, a new contributor and partner. Korea has not yet achieved its full economic or political stature in the global arena; nevertheless, its ability to do so has become a reality in the minds of young Koreans. Young people are self-confident and demand to be the agents of their own country's self-determination, including in relations with North Korea and the United States.  

The results of the open-ended questionnaire suggest that, although anti-American feelings are strong, they are not based on direct personal contact and experience. It is likely that Korean respondents developed anti-American feelings largely through the media and informal contacts. Adult Koreans who have had more contact with and knowledge of the United States have a more balanced and positive view of the American people and society, and of their influence in Korea and the world. Overall, the vast majority of those surveyed had no contact with American people and society. The results suggest that the best way to reduce anti-American feelings is to provide accurate information about the United States and encourage direct contact. Subsequent interviews with middle- and high-school students indicate that they obtain and share negative opinions concerning the United States, predominantly via the Internet. The results also suggest that the strongest anti-American feelings are likely to change if the people who harbor them receive more information or develop personal contacts. Given that there are no agencies responsible for promoting American studies, culture or tourism among Koreans, anti-American feelings are unlikely to diminish. 

The end of the bilateral economic relationship: the crisis of 1997

How did the 1997 crisis put an end to economic sponsorship between South Korea and the United States? The United States supported South Korea's economic growth after the Korean War. Many believe that this economic sponsorship came to an end in the mid-1980s, when South Korea recorded trade surpluses with the United States and trade disputes between the two countries escalated.  However, the sponsorship relationship did not end in the 1980s and continued until the financial crisis of 1997. At a time when Korea was most in need of financing—some would argue that the United States had pursued a very imprudent policy of capital account liberalization—the Treasury Department chose to turn its back on Korea, taking advantage of the crisis to settle old trade scores with Korea (Tcha 2004, p. 164).

Korea's industrial financing system relied heavily on the banking sector, which provided highly leveraged loans to the corporate sector.  As a result, banks found themselves with loan portfolios containing massive amounts of non-performing loans.  As long as the economy was growing and companies were able to repay their debts, the problem of non-performing loans could be solved. However, when the economy slowed down, an economy as exposed as South Korea's was likely to run into problems with the huge fixed costs in the form of interest payments, and it was not surprising that South Korea periodically slid into a severe financial crisis (The Korea Times 1999, p. 14). South Korea was fortunate to have an economic guarantor of last resort, the United States, with whom it enjoyed a special relationship based on military security. The United States was always ready to provide assistance help out in times of need, even if it sometimes rapped on the knuckles of Koreans who maintained trade barriers and didn't liberalize enough. At any time before 1989, Seoul could count on Washington and Tokyo to intervene and provide bilateral aid, the best example being the 1979–80 crisis,  which was probably the worst financial crisis in South Korean history.

During the economic collapse of 1979–1980, the United States acted swiftly to stabilize Korea and signaled to the international financial community that Korea was a good investment for new loans. The United States also pressured Japan to share the burden of rescuing Korea, and the subsequent Reagan-Suzuki agreement stipulated that maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula was important to Japan's security. In November 1997, when the South Korean Finance Minister asked Washington for bilateral aid, the refusal was swift and decisive.  This refusal put an end to the long relationship of economic patronage between the two countries (Tcha 2004, p. 166).

South Korea "humiliated" by the United States

Why did the United States refuse to help South Korea during the 1997 crisis? The United States government debated at length what to do about South Korea's impending debt. Several national security and foreign policy officials argued with the United States Treasury Department that South Korea should be bailed out bilaterally. Paul Bluestein, a Washington Post reporter who covered the Asian crisis, wrote that James Steinberg, the deputy national security adviser, had argued that "by not showing strong support for Korea, the United States risks provoking an anti-American reaction in Seoul that could lead to pressure for the withdrawal of United States troops" (The Washington Post 1997, A01).  National Security Adviser Sandy Berger wondered whether North Korea could cause damage if the South Korean economy collapsed, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued vigorously for a bailout. 
Robert Rubin, Lawrence Summers and several other American economists saw the crisis as the perfect opportunity to dismantle Korea Inc. once and for all, and wanted the IMF to impose conditions on South Korea that went far beyond the Fund's traditional limits.  Therefore, the Treasury Department kept pressuring IMF officials to extract more and more concessions from South Korea, including the immediate resolution of all trade issues in favor of the United States.  Angry Koreans were quick to accuse the IMF of constantly raising new issues at the request of the United States and of serving Wall Street brokerage firms far better than South Korea's needs (The New York Times 2020, p. 15).

According to the IMF's letter of intent, the accounting of Korean companies was to conform strictly to international standards, and the main financial institutions were to be controlled by internationally recognized companies. In addition, there would be a major restructuring of the financial sector, including a revision of the Bank of Korea Act to ensure the independence of the Central Bank with price stability as its primary mandate. The IMF letter of intent included trade liberalization, including outstanding issues such as transparency of import certification procedures, full capital account liberalization, corporate governance and structure, and labor market reform.

By signing the letter of intent on December 3, South Korea effectively betrayed itself (Kim 2010, p. 106). The problem was that significant concessions did not save South Korea, and it sank into deeper problems over time. Part of the problem was the refusal of the United States to send a credible signal to the world that it strongly supported the agreement by providing the more than $55 billion promised to South Korea.  This $55 billion consisted of $35 billion from the two Bretton Woods institutions and the Asian Development Bank, and a further $20 billion, known as the "second line of defense," which would be provided by wealthy governments (Kim 2016, p. 155). The problem was that South Korea could only avoid bankruptcy if it could guarantee all the loans under the plan, and the Treasury never intended to authorize the disbursement of the "second line of defense," for fear of being held accountable by Congress. The market could see that South Korea was running out of reserves, and when financial analysts looked at the hype around the $55 billion, they realized there was no way out. The race to the exit began, and by December 12, the IMF and Treasury were contemplating the unthinkable: letting Seoul go bankrupt (Kim 2016, p. 157).

In the end, the method chosen to save the bailout plan from failure was to round up the banks that had made large loans to South Korea and ask them to reschedule their debts (The Korea Times 2018, p. 13). Korea was an ideal case for a bailout. One wonders why it took Washington so long to accept the bailout call, as did the bankers who eventually rescheduled Korea's debt. As Germany's Finance Minister  puts it, the plan should not have waited until the last minute: "If the point of the exercise was to teach South Korea a lesson, the Treasury succeeded brilliantly." The Koreans learned the lesson the hard way, with massive corporate bankruptcies, large and small, and a recession that saw national income fall by 7%, wages for the average worker fall by 10% and unemployment climb to almost 9% (The Korea Times 2018, p. 14). But along the way, they also learned a different kind of lesson. At the time of their financial ruin, the United States had chosen to serve its own interests rather than help an ally. The economic basis of the United States-Korea alliance would look very different in the future (Kim 2016, p. 161).  

Since Koreans are more likely to be exposed to negative information about the United States and since positive influence or contact with the United States is likely to be minimal, anti-American sentiments are likely to increase. Since people are likely to process and assimilate information that conforms to their point of view and reject information that does not, anti-American feelings are likely to increase. In other words, based on the current trend, anti-American sentiment is very likely to increase, especially as the younger generation has much more negative views than adults. Anti-American sentiment in South Korea is not driven by ideology or tradition. It reflects the younger generation's growing confidence in themselves and their nation. South Korea's educational and economic success is creating a new generation of Koreans confident in their personal and collective ability to play an active role and contribute to the international scene. They do not hesitate to speak English or to engage in international competition. They are fully conversant with modern technologies. They want to participate on an equal footing in international life.

What needs to be done to stem the rise of anti-American sentiment? While there are no straightforward solutions, certain steps can be taken to address the issue. According to Chung-in Moon, Koreans must start from the humble premise that they cannot get rid of anti-American attitudes because they are an integral part of Koreans' personal and national psyche.  Even if Korean youth's perception of the United States seems particularly worrying and casts a shadow over the future of relations between the Republic of Korea and the United States, Koreans must come to terms with it. The more they try to artificially suppress them, the more likely it is that these feelings will become permanent. They must not be too sensitive to anti-American sentiment. They should see them as part of a normal process in a country undergoing major social, technological, political and ideological changes (Kim 2016, p.173).

Given the asymmetry of power and attention, it may not be conceivable for the United States to make similar efforts to understand South Korea. Nevertheless, the United States can be more cautious in its relations with South Korea. It should avoid giving the South Koreans the impression of unilateralism by engaging more in consultation and consensus-building with South Korea in the management of alliance affairs. Greater sensitivity to Korean culture and people would appear to be essential to improving Korean perceptions of the United States.

About the Author

Riyad Moosoody researches the role of the United States on the Korean Peninsula with a focus on hope and peace. He has researched the historiography of the Korean War and the role of veterans. His areas of study include Korean reunification, the Cold War, and the social, political, and economic impacts of the Korean War across countries worldwide. He devotes his efforts to understanding how wars continue to shape geopolitics in a new Cold War era involving the United States, Russia, China, India, the two Koreas, and Europe.

Korean version available here.

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