China’s practice of leveraging trade and market access as tools of diplomatic and security pressure—commonly referred to as “economic coercion”—has moved beyond a temporary phenomenon and now represents a structural threat to the international order, according to a leading U.S. expert.
Victor Cha, Senior Vice President for Geopolitics and Foreign Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a distinguished professor at Georgetown University, made the assessment during a special lecture held on the 6th at the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies in southern Seoul. The remarks accompanied the introduction of his newly published book, The Weaponization of Trade by China.
Cha described economic coercion as fundamentally different from protectionism or conventional trade disputes. Rather than addressing issues of market access or fair competition, he said, it involves the deliberate use of trade and investment restrictions to influence another country’s sovereign political decisions. “In China’s case, economic pressure has the effect of discouraging even public expression on issues such as democracy, human rights, and territorial sovereignty,” he noted, adding that the issue is closely tied to the resilience of the rules-based international system.
According to Cha, China has carried out at least 600 cases of economic coercion since 1997, targeting 18 countries and approximately 470 companies. U.S. firms accounted for the largest share, with 278 affected companies, followed by Japan with 59, and South Korea and Taiwan with 33 each. The number of incidents has risen sharply since President Xi Jinping came to power. Cha cautioned that the actual scale is likely much larger, as many governments and companies choose not to disclose retaliation for fear of further repercussions.
Cha highlighted several defining characteristics of China’s approach, including the use of informal and opaque measures, the absence of clear legal justification, and reliance on tactics that are difficult to challenge through the World Trade Organization (WTO). He cited restrictions on Norwegian salmon imports, curbs on rare earth exports to Japan, and limits on group tourism to South Korea as emblematic cases. “China rarely acknowledges sanctions publicly or leaves written records,” he said. “Instructions are often delivered verbally, leaving no paper trail.”
To counter Beijing’s pressure tactics, Cha argued that countries must go beyond defensive measures and identify China’s own structural vulnerabilities. Drawing on 2024 data from the UN Comtrade database, he noted that China depends on imports for more than 70 percent of supply in 589 product categories, including 259 items where import dependence exceeds 90 percent.
One notable example is OLED display panels, for which China’s import reliance stands at 94 percent. Given that a large share of these imports come from South Korea, Cha suggested coordinated action among allies could provide meaningful leverage. Other highly dependent imports include U.S.-produced acyclic hydrocarbons and Japanese industrial robots and silver powder, a critical material for solar panels.
“Individually, countries may be vulnerable, but collectively they possess real leverage,” Cha said. He emphasized the need for deterrence strategies that exploit asymmetric interdependence to prevent the weaponization of trade.
Cha also underscored the role of the United States, arguing that Washington should prioritize alliance coordination over unilateral trade measures. “What the United States should be doing is not imposing tariffs on allies, but bringing them together to respond collectively to China’s economic coercion,” he said. “Collective resilience not only deters Beijing, but also helps restore America’s strategic credibility.”
He concluded by noting that China’s responses to Japan’s evolving defense posture and South Korea’s debates over nuclear-powered submarines have followed similar patterns. “Economic coercion ultimately narrows the range of sovereign security choices available to states,” Cha said. “Only when allies and partners are confident that they will not face retaliation alone can they maintain autonomy in critical national security decisions.”
